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THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER AND THE
HEARTENING OF CONSERVATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPIRATIONS
James E. Fleming*
I. INTRODUCTION

The basic question for this conference is whether we as a people have
entered, or are on the verge of entering, a new constitutional order. In 2003,
Mark Tushnet published a terrific book, The New Constitutional Order, an
expansion of his insightful Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and
2
the Chastening of ConstitutionalAmbition in the HarvardLaw Review.
The title of that book was an inspiration for the title of this conference.
And the title of that article is the basis for the title of my article. For years,
liberals and progressives have been anticipating or announcing a
conservative revolution or counter-revolution ushering in a new
constitutional order.
Tushnet argued that the Rehnquist Court's
constitutional jurisprudence amounted to a chastening of constitutional
aspirations rather than a launching of a conservative revolution or counterrevolution.
Let me illustrate what he means by chastening as opposed to a revolution.
Consider United States v. Lopez, 3 in which the Rehnquist Court struck
down the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act basically forbidding students
to carry guns to school. It was the first case in sixty years in which the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down a federal law as exceeding Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce. Some alarmist liberals and progressives saw
the case as evidence of an impending conservative revolution. Tushnet, by
contrast, viewed it as chastening and symbolic: It really just sent a message
to Congress that there is no general federal police power. And, he argued,
the Act itself was a largely symbolic instance of "feel good legislation"

* Leonard F. Manning Distinguished Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
I prepared this article for the conference on "A New Constitutional Order?" held at Fordham
University School of Law on March 24-25, 2006. The article derives from an earlier piece
written for the Georgetown/Maryland Discussion Group on Constitutional Law.
1. Mark Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order (2003) [hereinafter Tushnet, The New
Constitutional Order].
2. Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of
ConstitutionalAmbition, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 29 (1999).
3. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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(after all, every senator and representative wants to be sternly on record as
4
being against kids taking guns to school).
Subsequently, Tushnet wrote another wonderful book, A Court Divided:
The Rehnquist Court and the Future of Constitutional Law. 5 There he
acknowledged that the conservative decisions of the Rehnquist Court he
had analyzed as chastening rather than revolutionary in his previous book
indeed had planted the seeds for a revolution. Everything depends, he
acknowledged, on the future: what kind of justices are appointed to the
Supreme Court and what use they make of these decisions. If revolutionary
Republicans instead of "chastening" Republicans (to say nothing of
liberals) are appointed, these decisions may become the tools for
6
revolution.
It seems to me that the developments that Tushnet insightfully analyzes
do represent a chastening of liberal and conservative constitutional
aspirations. But I also believe that those developments have engendered a
heartening of conservative constitutional aspirations-hence the title of my
article. I mean a heartening in three senses. One, conservative aspirations
have been heartened in the first instance by the very chastening of liberal
and progressive constitutional aspirations as such. Consider, for example,
conservatives who cut their teeth fulminating against a Warren Court
revolution, and who lamented the Burger Court's "counter-revolution that
wasn't."' 7 They may have taken heart in seeing the Rehnquist Court more
aggressively hold the line against liberal and progressive conceptions and
concerns. And much of what defines conservative constitutional ambitions
is opposition to liberal and progressive constitutional aspirations. I think
Jed Rubenfeld captures this point perfectly in his brilliant new book,
Revolution by Judiciary, where he characterizes the Rehnquist Court's
substantive agenda as an "anti-anti-discrimination agenda."'8 As I would
put it, that agenda is defined in opposition to the liberal and progressive
anti-discrimination agenda. Through this lens, we can grasp conservatives'
characterization of civil rights protections as "special rights" rather than as
attempts to secure the status of equal citizenship for everyone. 9
Two, conservative aspirations are expressed in some of the very
developments that liberals and progressives view as the chastening of

4. Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order, supra note 1, at 38-42.
5. Mark Tushnet, A Court Divided: The Rehnquist Court and the Future of
Constitutional Law (2005) [hereinafter Tushnet, A Court Divided].
6. Id. at 9-12, 319-45.
7. I allude here to The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't (Vincent

Blasi ed., 1983).
8. Jed Rubenfeld, Revolution by Judiciary: The Structure of American Constitutional
Law 158-83 (2005).
9. In Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the Court rejected the "special rights"
argument in the context of protecting homosexuals against discrimination. The logic of the
"special rights" argument extends to condemn protection of African Americans against
discrimination. See Walter F. Murphy, James E. Fleming, Sotirios A. Barber & Stephen
Macedo, American Constitutional Interpretation 1075 (3d ed. 2003).
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aspirations. Here I am reminded of an exchange I had with Bruce
Ackerman at one of Mark Tushnet's conferences at Georgetown some years
ago. Bruce was disparaging this generation of citizens for their puny
constitutional aspirations for a balanced budget amendment, as contrasted
with the great aspirations of the generations of FDR and the Great Society.
Playing devil's advocate, I argued that to conservatives, a balanced budget
amendment stands for worthy aspirations to fiscal responsibility and to
personal self-reliance as opposed to dependency upon government. I
suspect that much of what Tushnet views as a chastening of aspirations has
a similar flip-side heartening of conservative aspirations.
Three, I believe that we are right now witnessing the arousal of
conservative aspirations for a more ambitious counter-revolution yet to take
place, now that Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has been replaced by Justice
Samuel Alito, and even more so if Justice John Paul Stevens retires and is
replaced by George W. Bush appointees in the mold of Justices Antonin
Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Alito. Witness South Dakota's passage of an
abortion law directly challenging Roe v. Wade'0 and PlannedParenthoodv.
Casey' '-the commentary in the press indicating that anti-choice advocates
could not wait for Stevens to retire or die! 12 In this regard, I take little
comfort from Tushnet's analysis of the politics of appointments to the
Supreme Court, which suggested that it would be difficult if not impossible
for Bush to get counter-revolutionary conservatives like Scalia and Thomas
confirmed. 13 At the time Tushnet wrote, Bush's failed nomination of ultraconservative Miguel Estrada to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit offered some reason to believe that he was
right, and that the Democrats might have the commitment and fortitude to
block at least some nominations of counter-revolutionary conservatives.
But let us never forget the case of Clarence Thomas, who, after all, was
confirmed by a vote of 52-48. And Samuel Alito, in the final analysis, had
little difficulty being confirmed. Thus, I see no indication that Bush is
likely to back away from nominating extremely conservative Republicans
like Alito in favor of moderate Republicans like David Souter.
II.

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER:

MINIMALISM OR TRIUMPHALISM?

Tushnet argues that what Cass Sunstein calls judicial minimalism is the
jurisprudence of the new constitutional order. 14 This is Sunstein's idea that
courts should decide "one case at a time," writing narrow opinions that

10.
11.
12.
Mar. 7,
13.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
See Monica Davey, South Dakota Bans Abortion, Setting Up a Battle, N.Y. Times,
2006, at Al.
Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order, supra note 1, at 96-112.

14. Id. at 130-38.
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"leave things undecided" and thus open for democratic deliberation. 15
Indeed, it seems that minimalism would be appropriate for a constitutional
jurisprudence that aims to chasten constitutional aspirations rather than to
usher in a constitutional counter-revolution. But let us ponder the question
to whom minimalism would appeal. In what follows I mean to suggest
doubts about whether minimalism is a positive jurisprudential program for a
new constitutional order as opposed to a method of damage control, from
both liberal and conservative perspectives, during a period of transition
from one order to another.
One, it is understandable that minimalism would appeal to liberals and
progressives like Sunstein during a period of transition from a moderately
liberal court to a conservative court (and beyond that, to a genuinely new
constitutional order where conservative aspirations literally hold court).
After all, minimalism might serve as a jurisprudence of damage control for
liberals and progressives during such a period: For we inevitably are going
to face conservative judges and conservative decisions, but minimalism
promises to moderate and minimize the damage wrought by them. 16
Two, it is understandable that minimalism would appeal to pragmatic,
Clinton Democrats like Justices Stephen Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg
during such a period. Their judicial temperaments and substantive
constitutional sensibilities incline them to embrace minimalism. 17
Three, it is also understandable that minimalism would hold some appeal
for preservative conservatives like O'Connor, (sometimes) Anthony
Kennedy, and Souter, as distinguished from counter-revolutionary
conservatives like Scalia, Thomas, and (sometimes) Rehnquist (and now
Alito and, I suspect, John Roberts). I am using a distinction between two
types of conservativespreservative conservatives and counterrevolutionary conservatives-corresponding to two senses of conservative
in common parlance. 18 Preservative conservatives for the most part
preserve precedents rather than overrule them-even if, as an original
matter, they might have decided the cases differently-though they may
well take a "this far and no further" approach to precedents and drain them
of generative vitality. 19 Counter-revolutionary conservatives, on the other
hand, believe that a liberal revolution has occurred (here, the "Warren Court
revolution"), that it is their responsibility to bring about a conservative
counter-revolution, and that they must purge the law of precedents
15. Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court

(1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword. Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4

(1996).
16. James E. Fleming, Securing Constitutional Democracy: The Case of Autonomy 57
(2006).

17.
(2005);
18.
19.

See Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a JudicialVoice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185 (1992).
Fleming, supra note 16, at 117.
Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order, supra note 1, at 67; James E. Fleming,

Fidelity, Basic Liberties, and the Specter of Lochner, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 147, 152

(1999).
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manifesting liberal error at the earliest available opportunity. If they do not
have the votes to overrule these precedents, they seek to reinterpret them so
as to extirpate any generative force from them. To see the difference
between
preservative
conservatives
and
counter-revolutionary
conservatives, look at the clash between the joint opinion of O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter in Casey, on the one hand, and the dissents of Scalia
and Rehnquist in the same case, on the other, respectively. 20 Thomas is, of
course, also a counter-revolutionary conservative. The same is true of Alito
and, I suspect, Roberts. Rehnquist's counter-revolutionary conservatism
was moderated somewhat by the fact that he was Chief Justice. The same
may happen with Roberts.
Minimalism may especially appeal to
preservative conservatives in a time of 5-4 votes.
Four, it is even understandable that minimalism would appeal in some
cases to conservative chief justices like Rehnquist and Roberts during such
a period of transition. After all, in some cases they may not have the votes
to overrule precedents manifesting liberal error, or to reject altogether
certain "liberal" arguments. And so, in these cases, it may suit their
purposes to vote with the "liberal" majority, to assign the opinion to
themselves, and to issue a minimalist decision that controls the damage
from their conservative perspectives. But I do not see minimalism holding
much, if any, appeal for conservatives once they muster the votes, through
new appointments, to move beyond a transition period of chastening liberal
and progressive constitutional aspirations to a period of consolidating a
conservative revolution or counter-revolution. And again, I do not see the
Democrats in the Senate succeeding in blocking the appointment of
counter-revolutionary conservatives or inducing Bush to nominate
moderate, preservative conservatives. The case of Alito proved that.
Given Tushnet's previous excellent book, Taking the Constitution Away
from the Courts,2 1 one might have expected him to argue (or give greater
place to arguments) that hubris or what Linda Greenhouse has called
triumphalism, 22 not minimalism, is the characteristic jurisprudence of the
Rehnquist Court. Commentators like Greenhouse and Larry Kramer 23 have
decried the Rehnquist Court for its arrogance, its "activism" beyond the
Warren Court's wildest dreams, and its impending counter-revolution.
They do not see anything minimalist in the Rehnquist Court's decisions
(although they do have to account for occasional minimalist crumbs from
the table like Romer v. Evans24 and Lawrence v. Texas,25 protecting gays

20. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
21. Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999).
22. Linda Greenhouse, Divining the Consequences of a Court Divided, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 17, 2000, at WK1.
23. Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial
Review 224-33 (2004); Larry D. Kramer, No Surprise. It's an Activist Court., N.Y. Times,
Dec. 12, 2000, at A33.
24. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
25. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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and lesbians, and Grutter v. Bollinger,26 upholding affirmative action,
which in their view are likely to become fewer and farther between).
Granted, minimalism and hubris are not necessarily incompatible: For
example, a Court might insist on having the last or indeed the only word on
every question, yet insist that its word be minimalist. And Tushnet makes
numerous observations throughout The New ConstitutionalOrderthat show
27
that he recognizes the hubris and triumphalism of the Rehnquist Court.
This applies even more so to his book A Court Divided.28 But his account
of the jurisprudence of the new constitutional order would be fuller and
stronger if he analyzed more directly the relationship between minimalism
and triumphalism. As it stands, the relationship, and evident tension,
between the two remains underdeveloped.
III. BEYOND THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER?

In my observations so far, I have adverted to the possibility that the era of
chastening of constitutional aspirations that Tushnet perceptively analyzes
may be a transition period from a moderately conservative constitutional
order to a counter-revolutionary conservative constitutional order. Here I
want to address this possibility head on. Perhaps instead of boldly
announcing that we have entered "the new constitutional order," he should
have presented his book as a diagnosis of "our present constitutional
predicament" circa 2003. Granted, Princeton University Press might not
have thought such a title and the focus it suggests would be as catchy,
provocative, and publishable. By doing so, Tushnet could have postponed,
until it is more ripe, the whole colloquy with Ackerman concerning whether
we have entered a new constitutional order (without undergoing amendment
or revolution) or instead are in a period of normal politics. 29 And he could
have put off for a time the debate with Sandy Levinson and Jack Balkin
concerning whether we have witnessed a revolution or a mere chastening of
aspirations, and whether we should read Rehnquist Court opinions narrowly
(as he has) or broadly (as they have). 30 Between the time Tushnet drafted
much if not most of the book and the time he completed the manuscript, the
political landscape of this country changed considerably. He grants this. In
particular, we moved from a situation of divided government with a
Clinton-induced expectation of moderate presidential leadership to a
situation of unified Republican government with staunchly conservative
presidential leadership, staunchly conservative control of both houses of
Congress, and continuing conservative control of the Supreme Court. Even

26. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).

27. Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order, supra note 1.
28. Tushnet, A Court Divided, supra note 5.
29. See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (1991) [hereinafter Ackerman,
We the People: Foundations]; Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations (1998).
30. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the ConstitutionalRevolution,
87 Va. L. Rev. 1045 (2001).
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more so now. Furthermore, in Bush v. Gore,3 1 as Ackerman has aptly put
it, the Supreme Court packed itself.32 I speculate that the sting of this
charge motivated O'Connor and Rehnquist not to retire during Bush's first
term. Tushnet concedes that during a brief period of unified government
much could change. 33 We will see between now and 2008 and beyond.
Events in the near future could prove Tushnet to be a prophetic seer or a
fool. If the former, perhaps publishing the book will prove to have been
worth the risk. If the latter, maybe no one would blame him for trying to
make the best of a bad situation at a time when it may get even worse. In
any case, as Tushnet acknowledges in A CourtDivided, only the future will
tell whether the (for now) chastening as opposed to revolutionary decisions
will turn out to be the seeds for a conservative counter-revolution-it all
depends on the future composition of the Court and what the justices make
34
of these decisions.
I want to conclude by returning to the basic question for the conference:
Are we as a people entering a new constitutional order? Well, we do not
know yet. In the past, even when we have entered a new constitutional
order, we have denied it. Take the Reconstruction Revolution-The
Slaughterhouse Cases denied that any revolution had occurred. 3 5 Or take
the New Deal Revolution-as Ackerman has pointed out, "myths of
rediscovery" concerning the framers' vision were conjured up to deny that a
36
revolution had taken place.
What about today? Let me close by invoking a famous passage from
Hegel: "When philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has a shape of life
grown old. By philosophy's grey in grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only
understood. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of
the dusk."' 37 We will not know whether we have entered a new
constitutional order until after it occurs.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

531 U.S. 98 (2000).
Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself, Am. Prospect, Feb. 12, 2001, at 48.
Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order, supra note 1, at 100-01.
Tushnet, A Court Divided, supra note 5, at 9-12, 319-45.
The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1873).
Ackerman, We the People: Foundations, supra note 29, at 34-57.
G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right 13 (T. M. Knox trans., 1952).
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